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Recent advances in reinforcement learning research has 
achieved human level performance in playing video games 
(Mnih et al., 2015). This inspired me to understand the 
methods of reinforcement learning (RL) and investigate 
whether there is any basis for those methods in neurobiology 
and animal learning theories. The current study shows how 
RL is based on theories of animal conditioning and that there 
is solid evidence for neurobiological correlates with RL 
algorithms, primarily in the basal ganglia complex. This 
motivated a simple perceptron-based model of the basal 
ganglia called Q-tron, which utilizes the Q-learning 
algorithm. Additionally, I wanted to explore the hypothesis 
that adding an innate behavior to a Q-learning agent would 
increase performance. Thus four different agents were tasked 
with picking red flowers in the video game Minecraft where 
performance was measured as quantity of actions needed to 
pick a flower. A “pure” Q-learner called PQ used only the Q-
tron model. MAIA (Minecraft Artificial Intelligence Agent) 
used the Q-tron model together with an innate behavior 
causing it to try picking when it saw red. Two mechanisms of 
the innate behavior were tested, creating MAIA1 and MAIA2, 
respectively. The fourth agent called random walker (RW) 
chose actions at random and acted as a baseline performance 
measure. We show that both MAIA versions have better 
performance than PQ, and MAIA1 has performance 
comparable to RW. Additionally, we show a difference in 
performance between MAIA1 and MAIA2 and argue that this 
shows the importance of investigations into the precise 
mechanisms underlying innate behaviors in animals in order 
to understand learning in general.  
1 Introduction 
How would you teach a dog to play fetch? All dogs are not the 
same, but you might start with handing the dog its favorite toy 
and then take it back in exchange for a treat. Repeat this a few 
times and you can throw the toy on the ground and when the 
dog picks it up and hands it to you, it gets a treat again. You 
can then throw the toy farther away and step by step the dog 
will learn to play fetch. 
In computational modelling terms, this problem is 
commonly called reinforcement learning. As a cognitive 
scientist interested in artificial creatures and robots, the 
primary aim with the current study was to understand the 
fundamentals of reinforcement learning by simulating a robot 
that learns to pick flowers in a video game. The secondary aim 
was to investigate the animal learning basis of reinforcement 
learning and potential neurobiological evidence for the 
algorithms. The problem will thus be framed as one of an 
animal foraging for food. But when building a robot model we 
need to consider not only the learning mechanism but also 
how it will see and act. 
Recent advances in the use of neural networks for 
reinforcement learning has been shown to achieve human 
level performance in game playing (Mnih et al., 2013; 2015). 
The authors trained a “Deep Q-network” (DQN) to play 49 
two dimensional video games as well as, or better, than an 
expert human player. This was accomplished with only pixel 
values and game score as input. The method was based on the 
Q-learning algorithm (Watkins, 1989; Watkins & Dayan, 
1992) combined with deep learning (Bengio, 2009). This type 
of reinforcement learning resembles the operant conditioning 
used for teaching animals like our dog; for every action there 
is reward or punishment (Staddon & Niv, 2008). 
While the work of Mnih et al. (2015) is impressive, 
especially the ability of the agent to learn many different types 
of games with the same parameter settings, there are some 
issues. First, they state that the performance of their model is 
highly dependent on experience replay, a memory of previous 
experiences from which random samples are made to update 
the behavior of the agent between training episodes. They 
compare this behavior to the function of sleep and 
consolidation of memory in the hippocampus and state 
proudly how their work utilizes “biologically inspired 
mechanisms” (Mnih et al., 2015, p.532). However, experience 
replay as a method has existed for more than twenty years (Lin 
1991; 1992), so this exemplifies how machine learning 
research often uses neuroscientific findings as an afterthought 
more than a goal. Second, Schmidhuber (2015) explains, 
somewhat bitterly, how their claim of having done something 
truly new is debatable as something very similar was done by 
Koutník et al. (2013). Though to be fair, Mnih et al. did present 
preliminary results in their 2013 article. And third, while the 
performance of the Atari playing agent may be comparable to 
a human, the learning rate is surely not. The DQN required 38 
days (912 hours; Mnih et al., 2015, supplementary methods) 
to learn one game, while the professional human games testers 
used as controls had two hours of practice. Even though being 
a professional games tester grants a significant amount of 
experience that is difficult to account for in a direct 
comparison of learning rate, I am humbly willing to bet that a 
human ten-year-old with no experience with video games 
would match the performance of the DQN agent in shorter 
time than 38 days. It would be an interesting study to test 
children at different ages on how fast they can learn to play at 
“expert level” for these games, as we would then have a 
reference for the cognitive level of an AI agent. 
This difference in learning rate can be partly explained by 
the approach, which utilizes vast amounts of training data to 
learn the patterns of previous experience (called model-free 
learning, which will be further discussed below). When the 
DQN agent fails, it does so because it has not previously 
experienced that particular game state and the algorithm has 
not accurately generalized the past experiences into useful 
information. Humans can learn much quicker because we are 
able to generate predictions - have hypotheses - about the 
future based on prior knowledge, grounded in a view of the 
brain as a pattern predictor where top down connections try to 
predict the incoming sensory input and learning utilizes the 
errors in these predictions (Clark, 2013; Friston 2010). The 
common framework to explain such predictions is Bayesian 
statistics and is used for example in systems for self driving 
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cars (Petrovskaya & Thrun, 2009) and models of motor 
control (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). The important 
difference between the Bayesian predictions and the ones 
made by the DQN agent is that the Bayesian approach also 
takes the uncertainty of reward into account (O’Doherty, 
2012). 
However, the complexity of the calculations in Bayesian 
network models have been shown to be NP-hard, meaning that 
it is simple to confirm if the correct solution has been reached 
but the time to get there is non-deterministic (Gershman et al., 
2015). Computational models therefore need to exploit the 
structure of the agent’s environment in order to solve the two 
main issues that face these agents; action specification - 
identify the most useful set of actions - and action selection - 
find a policy indicating what action to take (Whiteson et al., 
2007). These two processes, action specification and action 
selection, occurs concurrently and dynamically with 
environmental interaction and has given rise to what is called 
embodied cognition (Clark, 2013; Wilson, 2002). 
Despite the above criticism of the work by Mnih and 
colleagues, they provided the seed that inspired me to 
understand the principles of their methods by attempting a 
similar but simplified Q-learning algorithm. Can this approach 
be useful to robots seen as embodied creatures in a three 
dimensional environment? 
1.1 Scope and Hypotheses 
We will start off with some basic theory of animal learning, 
then explain reinforcement learning followed by its 
neurobiological basis. This will show evidence of correlates 
for reinforcement learning algorithms, primarily in dopamine 
response of the basal ganglia system. We use these correlates 
as motivation for a model that combines Q-learning with the 
perceptron, creating what we call Q-trons. Each Q-tron 
represents an action and together, a collection of Q-trons thus 
form a very simple model of the basal ganglia, used as the 
brain in our agents. Functionality of the Q-tron model was 
pilot tested in a simple scenario with an agent finding its way 
through a house to a goal room in as few steps as possible. 
While Mnih et al. (2013; 2015) models an agent that plays 
video games, we instead adapted their approach to model 
agents as creatures that forage for food. In order to simulate 
an environment more similar to the one a robot or animal 
would navigate, the three dimensional video game Minecraft 
was chosen. Its game world consists of cubes that are 
combined to create fields, forests, hills, plants and animals 
similar to how Lego works. The player sees this world in a 
first person view and move around by using the mouse and 
keyboard. Interaction mainly consists of “chopping” (hitting) 
blocks to collect materials which allows for placing these 
blocks to build structures. 
The Minecraft agents were placed in an enclosed pasture 
filled with red flowers and their goal was to learn how to find 
and pick as many red flowers as possible, using only game 
screen pixels as input and picked flowers as the reward signal. 
Four agents were set loose in the pasture; the first was a 
“pure” Q-learner (model PQ), equipped with Q-trons. The 
second, a random walker (model RW) that chose actions 
completely randomly and was used as a baseline performance 
measure. The third and fourth models also used Q-trons but 
were additionally equipped with innate behaviors, causing 
them to “chop” if they saw red in the center of the screen. The 
difference between them were the details of the innate 
mechanism, and we call these models MAIA1 and MAIA2, 
where MAIA is the acronym for Minecraft Artificial 
Intelligence Agent. The addition of innate behavior is a way 
of exploiting knowledge of the environment similar to how 
animals evolve such behaviors (see below). 
The main hypothesis then, is that the MAIA agents will 
perform better than the PQ agent. The reasoning behind this is 
that MAIA only has to learn how to reach the “innate behavior 
trigger” (seeing red) while the PQ agent also needs to learn 
how to identify a flower and connect that object with the 
“chopping” action. 
2 Background 
“We have a brain for one reason and one reason only, and 
that’s to produce adaptable and complex movements.” 
(Wolpert, 2011) 
As an example of this “reason for brains”, Wolpert (2011) 
uses the sea squirt, which in its larval stage has a primitive 
brain and eyes, swims around and then as it reaches adulthood, 
plants itself on a rock and consumes its brain. In other words, 
it is very similar to the more well known couch potato. Now, 
one may have objections to Wolpert’s assumption, but it is a 
useful starting point to understand learning as a basic process 
allowing the creature to adapt to its environment.  
Learning has been shown in very simple animals like fruit 
flies, nematodes (Shettleworth, 2013) and even single-cell 
organisms (Armus & Montgomery, 2010). This is nice, as it 
gives us a valid reason for using learning as a basic behavior 
in our artificial agent. But if learning exists at such a basic 
level, one may ask what role innate behaviors - behaviors that 
do not require learning - play in producing movements? It 
boils down to the age old question of genes versus 
environment, or as Shettleworth (2013) expresses it 
“attempting to classify behavior as learned as opposed to 
innate is meaningless” (p.13-14). She uses as example a study 
of New Caledonian crows, investigating if their use of tools to 
“fish” for food is something learned or innate. Interestingly, 
young crows not allowed to see any form of tool use still 
picked up sticks and poked them into holes around the same 
age as crows allowed to see tool use, indicating some form of 
built in tendency to poke with sticks. But learning by way of 
trial and error still needed to occur for all of the crows to 
become successful in obtaining food. For this reason, the 
“innate” behaviors of our MAIA agents - the specifics of 
which will be described in the methods section - work in a 
similar fashion; the agent is predisposed to “chop” when it 
sees red but learning is still required to become efficient in 
finding and picking flowers. This behavior is further 
motivated by insects that forage flowers. For example, it has 
been shown that bumblebees not only use color and scent, but 
also exploit electric fields around flowers to decide which 
ones to visit (Clarke et al., 2013). 
Adaptable behavior can be framed as the problem of 
optimal decision making. We want to maximize reward while 
minimizing punishment, often also referred to as the principle 
of maximum expected utility (MEU; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947). This principle is behind what Gershman 
et al. (2015) call “computational rationality”, where they see 
MEU as the goal of perception and action under uncertainty. 
What this means is that in chess for example, every possible 
move is evaluated according to its expected utility and you 
choose the move with the highest value. However, this is what 
computers do, not humans. Because our brains have limited 
resources, we approximate the MEU, but this approximation 
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is in turn bounded by the same limited resources and so is 
thought to be why humans sometimes make decisions that 
cannot fully be explained by rational rules (Gershman et al., 
2015). 
2.1 Training animals with conditioning 
As the utility of behavior is closely connected to the question 
of choice or decision making - how, then, do we make optimal 
choices to maximize rewards and minimize punishments? The 
well established theory of conditioning provides some 
answers. But we should first define reward (also called 
reinforcer) as an object or event that “elicits approach and is 
worked for” (Wise, 2004). The value of these reward objects 
or events are given through either an innate mechanism like 
food and sex (also called primary rewards) or through learning 
(Schultz, 2006). 
There are two main forms of conditioning; classical (or 
Pavlovian) and instrumental (or operant) (Cerruti & Staddon, 
2003). In classical conditioning, the animal learns to associate 
a neutral stimulus with an upcoming reward. To use Pavlov’s 
(1927) classic experiment as an example, hungry dogs were 
given food (unconditioned stimulus, US) following a tone 
(conditioned stimulus, CS). At first, the food caused salivation 
(unconditioned response, UR), but after a number of trials the 
dogs began to salivate when they heard the tone. At this point, 
the salivation response is called conditioned response (CR). In 
operant conditioning, the animal is required to perform a 
wanted behavior in order to receive the reward which is not 
the case in classical conditioning. In other words, rewards 
cause changes in observable behavior in both cases of 
conditioning but in classical conditioning the behavioral 
reaction does not affect outcome while instrumental 
conditioning requires a behavioral response for reward to 
occur. We can now see that our introductory question of 
teaching a dog to play fetch is a form of operant conditioning. 
In both forms of conditioning, the common factor is that 
the animal learns to predict outcomes. The dogs in Pavlov’s 
experiments learned that the tone predicted the upcoming food 
reward and our fetch playing dog learns to predict that by 
performing a behavior sequence, it will receive a reward. 
Learning is mediated through the errors of these predictions 
and it follows then that as prediction error decreases, so does 
learning (for that specific case). This has been formalized in 
the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972; here adapted from Schultz, 2006): ∆" = $%(" − ()  (1) 
where ΔV is the change in associative strength (i.e. learning) 
between the CS and reward and is proportional to the 
prediction error (" − (); V is the actual value and λ is the 
predicted value. α and β are parameters that depend on aspects 
of the stimuli and modifies the learning rate. So what this 
means is that a reward that is fully predicted does not 
contribute to learning. It is also important to add that this 
learning rule works both ways; associative strength can also 
decrease if reward is withheld. This way of removing an 
association is called extinction. 
What is needed for a reward to become a goal? Balleine & 
Dickinson (1994; 1998) believes that the goal should be 
mentally represented in the animal when the behavior is being 
prepared and executed. This representation should contain a 
prediction of future reward and the associative strength 
connecting behavioral action to reward. The animal should 
also have an established internal representation of reward that  
 
Figure 1. A standard reinforcement model set in our pasture. See 
text for explanation. The player’s face has been covered to avoid 
privacy concerns. 
updates when the reward changes value. The importance of 
these principles will be shown further below as we describe 
the neurobiology of reinforcement learning and prediction 
error. 
So, in goal-directed behavior we need to make choices. 
Since these choices cannot be observed directly and internal 
states have historically been seen as irrelevant in operant 
conditioning experiments, choice has been measured 
indirectly with response strength of the animal and the value 
of choice alternatives (Cerruti & Staddon, 2003). But we are 
interested in modelling the internal states and so need to look 
to reinforcement learning for answers. 
2.2 Training machines with reinforcement learning 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a form of unsupervised 
learning, meaning that the agent explores the environment and 
the evaluation of outcomes are made concurrently with 
learning. This can be contrasted with supervised learning, 
where the system’s outcomes are compared to known 
examples of correct input and output and the system 
parameters are modified according to any discrepancies 
found. When RL agents explore their environment, they 
transition from one state to another by taking actions and is 
rewarded or punished after each action taken or at some point 
in the future. This allows for learning to occur without 
specifying exact behavior patterns and the use of rewards 
makes it possible to model both forms of conditioning 
(Kaelbling et al., 1996). 
There are two main ways of solving RL problems 
(Kaelbling et al., 1996). One is to search the behavior space 
for an optimal behavior, commonly applied with genetic 
algorithms. In broad terms, genetic algorithms spawn an initial 
generation of randomized behaviors and the most successful 
ones are combined (the official academic term for “have sex”) 
to spawn new generations and so on. Another way to solve the 
problem is to estimate the utility of taking actions in states of 
the world (the MEU mentioned above), which is the approach 
we shall focus on presently. It is worth mentioning here that 
many successful attempts have been made to combine the two 
approaches (e.g. Whiteson et al., 2007). 
The standard reinforcement model can be seen in Figure 1. 
It assumes a stationary environment - it does not change over 
time. Neither does the probability of receiving a reward r (also 
called reinforcement signal). Both of these assumptions are 
broken in our case, since flowers disappear when picked 
causing the environment to change and therefore also changes 
the probability of reward. The innate behavior and exploration 
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strategy (explained below) can compensate for this. Referring 
back to Figure 1 again, the behavior B should choose actions 
according to a policy π that maximizes the sum of r over the 
total run time of the simulation. T is the state transition 
function, defining how the agent’s action a transitions the 
world from one state s to the next. Because the agent does not 
necessarily know what causes r and may not be able to observe 
the entire world state, I and R refer to the “true” functions of 
input and reward, where i is the observed input. 
RL algorithms now face three main challenges when trying 
to find the optimal behavior policy π* (Kaelbling et al., 1996). 
The first is the exploration/exploitation problem. How should 
we balance exploration of the environment with exploiting the 
knowledge already gathered? Most techniques progressively 
decrease the exploration towards zero as time increases, but if 
the environment is dynamic some exploration must always 
occur. The exploration/exploitation strategy is usually 
denoted ε, and a common strategy for dynamic environments 
is ε-greedy. It chooses random actions (exploration) with a 
probability p, which can be adjusted during the agent’s 
training. When exploiting its knowledge, it always chooses the 
action with the highest value, hence the name greedy. In more 
dynamic environments, it may be that several actions have 
values that are very close which the ε-greedy policy does not 
consider. So a more refined version would be the Boltzmann 
distribution for exploration as demonstrated by Mnih et al. 
(2015). 
The second problem is how the algorithm should take the 
future into account, since the agent has no way of knowing 
how many steps there will be until reward is received. 
Building upon the above mentioned MEU, a basic and 
common optimality model is the infinite-horizon discounted 
model (Barto, 2007; Kaelbling et al., 1996). The expected 
utility is the sum of all future rewards geometrically 
discounted with the parameter - (0 ⩽ - < 1). So for each state 
we have a value, V(s), like so: " . = /( -0102034 )   (2) 
The E is for expected value, so this means that with gamma 
close to 1, future rewards will be more important than 
immediate rewards and vice versa, so that we can adjust the 
importance of those future rewards for the the expected utility. 
Equation (2) forms the basic reasoning behind the more 
complex algorithms we will soon discuss. Interesting to note 
here is that regardless of the value of gamma, early rewards 
will be worth more than later ones, which is precisely how I 
like my marshmallows. 
The third problem is the question of convergence and 
performance. Some algorithms can be proved mathematically 
to converge to the optimal policy π*, but for more complex 
environments and agent behaviors this is not always possible. 
In those cases, the performance of the chosen optimality 
model can instead be measured by the speed with which it 
converges to optimality or near-optimality and we can also 
measure the level of performance after a given time (Kaelbling 
et al., 1996). The assumption of (2) is also that there are 
regularities between the state signals (i in Figure 1) and reward 
values, if there are no such regularities the predictions become 
random guessing (Barto, 2007). We can model these possible 
regularities using Markov chains, a method that calculates 
future probabilities based on the current state without relying 
on previous ones (Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
A common family of methods building on Markov chains 
is temporal difference (TD) learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998) 
upon which many different variants have been developed. By 
utilizing a specialized form of Markov chain called Markov 
Decision Process (MDP), they can be described as extending 
the Rescorla-Wagner rule (Niv, 2009). We shall not explain 
Markov chains or MDP’s in detail, but very briefly, and as 
mentioned above, Markov chains and MDP’s allow us to 
model the probabilities of the state transition function and the 
probability of reward for a state (as seen in Figure 1). The 
important take-away here is that these methods assume having 
a model of the world, but model-free (see below) versions 
exist that build on the ability of the agent to explore and take 
samples of the environment (i and r in Figure 1). With 
increasing amounts of samples, the agent can approximate the 
true functions I, R and T (Figure 1). TD learning managed to 
explain something that the Rescorla-Wagner rule could not; 
second order conditioning, where a learned association like 
tone-food could be built upon to create for example light 
signal-food by coupling the light signal to the tone (Niv, 
2009). 
Now, to further complicate the matter, these methods also 
rely on the assumption that state transition probabilities are 
fixed. This means that they describe Pavlovian conditioning 
and not instrumental conditioning, which is what we are 
interested in for our agent. As Niv (2009, p.8) puts it: “Since 
the environment rewards us for our actions, not our 
predictions (be they correct as they may), one might argue that 
the ultimate goal of prediction learning is to aid in action 
selection.” Indeed, this leads us to the “temporal credit 
assignment” problem (Sutton & Barto, 1998) - how do we 
figure out what actions led to reward? 
2.2.1 Finding the optimal policy 
If we have a model of the environment we can find the optimal 
policy in two ways; value iteration or policy iteration (Sutton 
& Barto, 1998). Each state has a value V(s) and the optimal 
value for a state, V*(s), is the expected infinite discounted 
reward (equation (2)) that will be gained in that state given a 
policy π. The optimal policy π*(s) is the optimal way of 
choosing actions given values V. By iterating over values and 
using mathematical relations between V* and π* we can find 
one given the other. So by iterating over values, we find the 
policy by successive approximations of V*. In policy iteration, 
given an initial action, all V are calculated for each state. Then 
the initial action is changed to see if the total V is better and if 
so the policy is updated to choose that initial action instead 
and progressively π* is approximated. 
When we do not have a model of the environment, which 
is the case for our flower picker MAIA, there is still hope. 
Either we learn the behavior B (Figure 1) without a model 
(model-free methods) or learn an approximation of the model 
and use that to choose the behavior (model-based methods). 
These model-based methods should not be confused with the 
previously described case where we actually have a model of 
the environment. Model-free methods have the disadvantage 
of using gathered data extremely inefficiently and so need lots 
of experience to achieve good performance, while model-
based methods are faster in learning time but instead require 
significantly more computational power (Kaelbling et al., 
1996). There are however ways of combining the two methods 
for improved performance over using either one and also 
indications that a similar combination exists in the brain 
(Gershman et al., 2015; also see below section on biological 
basis for reinforcement learning). 
An interesting observation to make here is that the DQN 
agent by Mnih et al (2015) uses a model free algorithm (Q-
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learning; see below) which is part of the reason for why it 
needs such a long training time as 38 days. But even then, their 
use of computational power to do that training is massive. 
They unfortunately do not mention how much power they 
used, but it is a safe bet that they did their training on clusters 
of graphic processing units (GPU). One such GPU uses 
around 200 watts while the human brain uses around 20 watts 
(Versace & Chandler, 2010). So if a model-free algorithm 
requires at least ten times the power a brain does, a model-
based method would require - as just mentioned - significantly 
more. 
2.2.2 Q-learning 
Q-learning (Watkins, 1989; Watkins & Dayan, 1992) is a 
model-free method that builds on TD-learning. It combines 
policy and value iteration by directly approximating the 
optimal policy and looks like follows: 5 ., 7 = 5 ., 7 + $(1 + -97:;<5 .=, 7= − 5 ., 7 )   (3) 
where s is the current state, a is the action chosen in that state, 
s’ the new state after a is taken and a’ the predicted optimal 
action in state s’. As in equation (1), r is the reward and γ the 
discount parameter. The α refers to the learning rate, a 
parameter used to adjust how much the Q-value can change 
every update. It should also be noted that the reward value can 
have positive and negative values, reflecting reward and 
punishment, respectively. Adding negative values for actions 
that do not lead to reward can be interpreted as adding cost for 
actions. 
So what happens here is that the agent is in a state s and 
chooses an action a according to some strategy. That action is 
performed and the agent observes the new state s’ and its 
reward r. The trick lies in using the predicted optimal action 
a’ for the state s’ (maxQ in (3)) to update the Q-value for the 
state-action pair (s, a). In other words, the agent stores 
estimations about the value of possible actions for each state 
and as actions are taken, the actual received reward is 
compared to the estimation. The difference is the prediction 
error which is used to update the estimation function. Thusly, 
the prediction error for Q-learning is: >11?1 = $(1 + -97:;<5 .=, 7= − 5 ., 7 ) (4) 
Progressively, as the prediction error approaches zero, the 
estimation function in turn approaches the true values of 
actions. To compare with the Rescorla-Wagner rule in 
equation (1); r is the actual reward given and Q(s, a) is the 
predicted value. The Q-learning algorithm has been proven to 
converge with probability 1 as long as each action is executed 
in each state an infinite number of times on an infinite run 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). In other words, convergence of the 
algorithm is unaffected by the exploration strategy (ε, as 
mentioned above). 
However, the strategy of exploration/exploitation still 
needs to be carefully chosen for learning rate to be as quick as 
possible. Especially as there are very few cases where we can 
realistically visit every state-action pair an infinite number of 
times. The parameters are also important to choose wisely. 
Bayer & Glimcher (2005) found in their study that an α of .7 
concurred with their physiological recordings. In practice, 
however, it is feasible to use a constant α of 0.1 (Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). For γ, we want to choose a high value in our case 
of picking flowers; since there may be many steps before a 
reward is received, we need to take into account potential 
actions and rewards far into the future. 
2.2.3 Continuous states and partially observable 
environments 
So far, the methods discussed have assumed that we have 
discrete states and actions, so that the predicted values can be 
stored in lookup-tables. When we move to continuous or very 
large spaces, like our agent MAIA walking around in the 
flower filled pasture, we need to use some other representation 
of mapping state-action pairs to values. This is called function 
approximation for which there are many methods but we will 
focus on the use of artificial neural networks (described in 
more detail below). The side effect of using such a function 
approximation is that convergence can no longer be 
guaranteed (Kaelbling et al., 1996). 
Another difficulty is when the agent cannot observe the 
entire state of its environment, only parts of it (as described 
with the relation between I and i in Figure 1). This is the case 
for MAIA since it only observes what is in front of it. If you, 
dear reader, would be out picking flowers in a pasture, you 
would also observe only part of your environment. To fully 
observe the environmental state, you would have to know 
exactly where all flowers in the field are at all times, like 
having a live satellite feed. In short, most real world problems 
need to handle the case of partially observable environments 
and these are commonly modelled by partially observable 
Markov decision processes (POMDP), though it is also 
possible to ignore the problem and rely on the randomness in 
the exploration/exploitation implementation (Kaelbling et al., 
1996). 
However, one can also utilize knowledge of the world and 
implement predefined knowledge into the agent. A nice 
example of this is Tesauro’s (1995) TD-gammon, a 
backgammon playing agent. He had a basic version with 
minimal prior knowledge and an improved version with 
explicit knowledge of backgammon pre-programmed. The 
basic version was not nearly as effective as the improved 
version which achieved performance comparable to 
backgammon masters. As previously mentioned, this is the 
approach MAIA uses with its “innate” behavior. 
2.2.4 Methods to improve performance and convergence 
The DQN agent by Mnih et al. (2015) was highly dependent 
on the method of experience replay. The DQN agent stores 
every experience - a sequence of state-action-reward-state - 
and during the regular update of the Q-value these experiences 
are randomly sampled and used for smaller updates of the 
same value. This is slightly different from Lin (1991; 1992) 
who instead uses lessons - a collection of experiences from 
starting state to end state - and at the end of one lesson, the 
experiences are iterated over recursively to update the Q-
value. The experience replay method is itself based on a 
similar mechanism used in Sutton’s (1990) Dyna architecture 
called relaxation planning, where the model generated 
hypothetical experiences to update the Q-function. Lin (1991) 
states that experience replay is faster and does not require a 
model to be learned (since Dyna is model-based). 
Another method is the eligibility trace (Barto, 2007). Like 
experience replay, it also saves state-action pairs and updates 
them according to their eligibility trace parameter, which 
decides how many steps back these updates should be made, 
the size of the agent’s short term memory if you so will. More 
recent state-action pairs have a larger impact than those farther 
back in history. The eligibility trace also has the advantage of 
being capable of on-line updates, without explicitly storing 
previous states (Kaelbling et al., 1996). 
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Figure 2. It is very difficult to find a picture showing all areas we 
mention, but this one shows the VTA and SN pathways; both of 
which will be shown to be important in relation to reinforcement 
learning algorithms. Adapted from Arias-Carrión et al. (2010). 
2.3 Biological basis for reinforcement learning 
As we have seen, reinforcement learning is a big and complex 
set of tools and theories. But since we are interested in finding 
something out about animals - and by extension, humans - is 
there any relevance to reinforcement learning? What 
biological connections are there, if any? 
Whatever one’s opinion on behaviorism’s failure to 
account for internal states, the approach has given us loads of 
behavioral data on classical and instrumental conditioning that 
we can use for neurobiological investigations of reward. We 
will here briefly review findings on established and possible 
connections for RL as a computational model of learning in 
animals. But first, some general observations on reward and 
dopamine. 
Reward in neurobiological studies is often used as a 
collective term for effects not only of reinforcement but also 
motivational arousal, the latter meaning that an animal given 
reward is “energized” before and during the next trial (Wise, 
2004) or more formally; preparatory or approach behavior 
toward reward (Schultz, 2006). It seems to only affect “extra” 
arousal however, as dopamine blockage (usually done with 
neuroleptic drugs) still allows normal responses for previously 
rewarded stimuli (Wise, 2004). One should also keep in mind 
that reward is not always easy to separate from attention in 
these kinds of studies (Schultz, 2006; also discussed below). 
Nevertheless, the neurotransmitter dopamine has been 
identified with both motor and motivational functions (Wise, 
2004), making it highly interesting in relation to our 
previously mentioned RL algorithms that build on reward for 
action selection. It is, however, difficult to clearly distinguish 
between these roles in animal experiments. Since we cannot 
speak to the animals, we cannot differentiate between “wants 
to but cannot” and “can but does not want to” as Wise (2004) 
puts it. This difficulty in boundary distinction is reflected in 
the neuroanatomy as we shall see presently. 
As seen in Figure 2, most dopamine cells develop in the 
mesencephalic-diencephalic junction (VTA and SNc area)  
and project to forebrain targets (Wise, 2004). Motor function 
is mostly connected to the nigrostriatal system (substantia 
nigra (SN) and striatum) and motivational function with the 
ventral tegmental area (VTA). The VTA has two main 
systems, the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine systems, 
where the former mainly projects to nucleus accumbens and 
olfactory tubercle and less so to the septum, amygdala and 
hippocampus and the latter projects to prefrontal, cingulate 
and perirhinal cortex (Wise, 2004). There is considerable 
overlap between the mesolimbic and mesocortical systems 
and they are therefore often referred to as the 
mesocorticolimbic systems. To add to this complexity, there 
is no clear boundary between the nigrostriatal system and 
VTA which makes it, as mentioned previously, difficult to 
distinguish between the motor and motivational dopamine 
systems (Wise, 2004). 
This complexity for dopamine’s role in goal-directed 
behavior is summed up by Wise (2004, p.9): “a conservative 
position would be that dopamine acts in nucleus accumbens, 
dorsal striatum, amygdala, frontal cortex and perhaps other 
sites to reward immediate behavior and to establish 
conditioned motivational cues that will guide and motivate 
future behavior.” Though details have been added since then 
the larger picture of their integration into a general theory 
largely remains unanswered (Schultz, 2015; Dayan & 
Berridge, 2014; but see below on basal ganglia). We shall thus 
not go much further into the rabbit hole of non-conservative 
positions, but will add that Schultz (2006) reports that for 
primary rewards, activations of most of these structures have 
been shown to reflect the actual reward and not the sensational 
experience itself (that is, the reward of food and not the taste 
of it) and also that there are indications that different parts of 
these structures may code for different dimensions of stimuli 
(like vision, olfactory or spatial information, all of which can 
be interpreted as the factors α and β in equation (1)). 
When it comes to reinforcement, dopamine modulates 
many aspects of conditioning and seems to be most crucial in 
positive reinforcement (Wise, 2004; Schultz, 2006). When 
blocking dopamine function, for example with neuroleptics, 
both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning is impaired in 
different ways (Wise, 2004). But the role of dopamine is still 
very unclear, as is evidenced by Wise (2004) who reports; 
first, that dopamine blockage is functionally equivalent to 
intermittent omission of reinforcement showing similar 
progressive decline in responding to unrewarded trials; and 
second, that dopamine blockage can have the opposite effect - 
that animals are unable to learn that they are not given 
rewards. 
We thus have many conflicting findings regarding 
dopamine’s role in reward and learning, and should keep in 
mind that other neurotransmitters and brain areas also are 
involved in learning. But the dopamine system is the most 
studied in regards to reward, and it seems to have such an 
important role for reinforcement learning that it leads Schultz 
(2006) to formulate the following general rule: @AB1>.C?D.> = 1>E71FB?GGH1>F − 1>E71FBC1>FIGJ>F (5) 
Again, we have a rule that is similar to the Rescorla-Wagner 
rule in equation (1) and also the one for Q-learning in equation 
(4). Can this really be true? Let’s find out. 
2.3.1 Reward prediction error hypothesis of dopamine 
The first clear evidence of dopamine neuron activation 
representing prediction error came in the early 90’s 
(Montague et al., 1996). Schultz et al. (1997) added to this by 
showing how previous studies on recordings from dopamine 
neurons in monkeys during conditioning tasks showed a 
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striking similarity with the error functions described by TD-
methods (Figure 3). 
Compare the results shown in Figure 3 to the story of 
Pavlov’s dogs told above. If given food at a random time, 
dopamine neurons in the midbrain will fire more rapidly to 
reflect that something unexpected happened as in Figure 3 (a). 
After being trained with receiving food at a set length of time 
after a tone, the reward will no longer be unexpected but the 
tone will still be unexpected, so the prediction error reaction 
in the dopamine neuron now happens after the tone as in 
Figure 3 (b). And even more intriguingly, in Figure 3 (c) we 
can see that if the reward is withheld from the trained animal, 
the neuron will decrease its firing rate at the precise time when 
reward was predicted to occur, indicating that the neuron also 
encodes the timing of reward. However, Bayer & Glimcher 
(2005) found evidence of dopamine neurons encoding only 
positive reward prediction errors, meaning the case in Figure 
3 (c) might be encoded by different neurons and they suggest 
serotonin as a possibility, since it has been implicated to have 
a role in other aversive events. It could also be the case that 
the divergent results can be explained by the different 
recording sites used, as Bayer & Glimcher (2005) recorded 
from the substantia nigra (SN, see Figure 2) area and Schultz 
et al. (1997) from the ventral tegmental area (VTA; see Figure 
2). It has later been suggested that the SN and VTA circuits 
may be functioning in accordance with the actor/critic TD-
model, where the SN circuit works as the actor - learning the 
action-selection policy - and the VTA circuit works as the 
critic - learning predictions of the world, essentially the model 
of the world (Niv, 2009). 
What this means is that the previous hypothesis of 
dopamine representing reward occurrence was not the whole 
story, it seemed to instead (or rather also; see mention of 
motivational arousal above and attention below) represent a 
prediction error precisely in line with the logic behind the 
learning rules we have discussed. This has become known as 
the reward prediction error hypothesis of dopamine 
(Montague et al., 1996), and many other aspects of TD models 
have been shown to be reflected in dopamine neurons (Niv, 
2009; Schultz, 2007; Schultz, 2006; Wise, 2004; Schultz, 
2015), one of which is the previously mentioned second order 
conditioning. If the monkey in Figure 3 (b) is trained with an 
additional CS before the tone, the prediction error response 
will move from the tone to that additional CS. Another 
important example would be the dopamine response reflecting 
that the most recent reward is more important for the error 
function than rewards farther back in time (Bayer & Glimcher, 
2005). This is similar to the function of eligibility traces and 
Pan et al. (2005) show that they may indeed be essential to 
dopamine error functioning. 
Most of those results however were based on Pavlovian or 
very basic instrumental conditioning tasks, so what of more 
complicated cases of action selection, for example one where 
all available actions lead to reward but of different magnitude? 
Morris et al. (2006) conducted a study that elucidated in more 
detail what kind of TD-related method could best explain the 
dopamine neuron response in such a task. Monkeys saw four 
kinds of stimuli presented to the left or right of a screen and 
were trained to respond with a left or right movement of the 
arm, corresponding to the placement of the stimuli. The four 
stimuli were followed by reward with different probability 
ranging from .25 to 1 in .25 steps. The results from SN neuron 
recordings indicated that the dopamine prediction error 
response reflected an action choice already made, instead of 
reflecting the selection process itself. This detail is not in line  
 
Figure 3. Each row of dotted line represents a single trial, where 
each dot is the neuron firing. The bars on top of each graph 
represents the average over those trials. The conditioned stimulus 
CS was a tone and the reward R was fruit juice. In (a) the reward R 
occurs without CS and the neuron increases activity to report that 
something unpredicted happened. (b) shows how after training, the 
prediction error response has moved to just after the CS and since 
the reward R has been learned to be predicted, there is no change in 
activity when it is given. And in (c) we can see how the neuron 
activity is decreased when a trained animal expects a reward, but it 
is not delivered. This last example shows how information about the 
timing of reward delivery also seems to be encoded in the neuron’s 
activity. Adapted from Schultz et al. (1997). 
with the actor/critic model but is the difference between how 
Q-learning and its related method SARSA works, the latter 
being the one found in the monkeys (Morris et al., 2006). In 
Q-learning, the prediction error is determined by the action 
with the highest Q-value (maxQ in equation (3)) and not the 
action that was actually chosen, while in SARSA the 
prediction error is determined by the chosen action (Niv et al., 
2006). However, in a similar task but done with rats making 
odor decisions and recordings made in VTA dopamine 
neurons, Roesch et al. (2007) found their results to be more 
similar to the Q-value representations in Q-learning than those 
in SARSA (or other methods). 
Additionally, some dopamine neurons in dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex seem to represent different behavioral 
outcomes in that one neuron may activate for reward and 
moving left, while another activates for the same reward but 
for moving right to receive that reward (Schultz, 2006). 
However, these activations may also be related to some form 
of “excitement” or even attention as mentioned previously. 
This may all seem very promising, but as with all 
neuroscience research, the deeper you go the more complex a 
picture arises. O’Doherty (2012) mentions how there seems to 
be two different behavioral mechanisms underlying action 
selection, in that one is is model-based and used for goal-
directed selection of actions based on their value (which is 
based on later reward) and the other a model-free mechanism 
for stimulus-response associations. We have previously 
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mentioned the actor/critic method and also how combinations 
of model-free and model-based methods can perform better 
than either alone (Gershman et al., 2015), but as we saw these 
cannot explain all aspects of neurobiological findings. 
There is furthermore the issue of finding evidence for RL 
in humans, as we have until now mostly discussed animal 
findings. We shall not go into much detail, as the model MAIA 
uses is not complex enough to warrant any comparisons to 
human functioning. Also, human behavior is often so different 
between individuals that it is difficult to draw comparisons to 
specific algorithms (Shteingart & Loewenstein, 2014). But it 
is worth mentioning that there are indications of neural 
correlates for the dopamine prediction error in humans (Niv, 
2009).  
2.3.2 The basal ganglia and action selection 
Several brain areas have so far been mentioned, like the VTA 
(ventral tegmental area) and SN (substantia nigra). We shall 
now present these in their larger context - the basal ganglia. 
Interestingly, the basal ganglia system seems to be very 
similar across vertebrate species, suggesting that its role is 
very old in evolutionary terms (Redgrave et al., 1999; 
Redgrave, 2007). That role seems to be, as we have seen in 
our previous discussion, related quite closely to learning and 
action selection in a reinforcement learning framework. 
Though we should mention that the basal ganglia system is 
also involved in other functions like fatigue and apathy 
(Chakravarthy et al., 2010). 
Before we move on, we should mention here the role of 
attention in action-selection and action specification. 
Perceptual attention mediates both action-selection and action 
specification, so there is a problem of knowing exactly what 
is selected and where it happens (Prescott et al., 2007). Action 
selection may be a global property of the brain and body in 
their environment (as per embodied cognition mentioned in 
the introduction). But if there in fact are specialized 
components for this problem then we need to determine what 
is required by them. Redgrave et al. (1999) does exactly this, 
and they have four criteria for such a system. Its inputs should 
provide information about relevant internal and external cues; 
each available action should have an associated utility value 
calculated by a mechanism internal to the system; conflicts 
between available actions should be resolved based on those 
values; and the system’s output should allow the winning 
action to be performed. Luckily, the basal ganglia seem to 
match these criteria (Redgrave et al., 1999; Redgrave, 2007; 
Prescott et al., 2007; Chakravarthy et al., 2010), but as we’ve 
seen in the discussion on dopamine error signals, the details 
are unclear. Those details can be very important and as an 
example of this, Prescott et al. (2007) describes a study with 
computational modelling showing that the location of 
synapses on input neurons to the basal ganglia have significant 
effects on network function. 
2.4 Synthesis 
For the implementation of MAIA, we will not pay attention to 
attentional processes. We will instead focus on action 
selection within the reinforcement learning framework as 
modelled by Q-learning. Perception is handled by taking 
screenshots of the game screen, so what the agent will receive 
as input is roughly similar to retinotopic maps found in 
LGN/V1 of the visual processing stream (Wandell et al., 
2007). Motor output is also not handled in detail, our system 
will select an action and that action is performed by sending  
 
Figure 4. The perceptron. Inputs s1, s2 and b are first multiplied by 
their respective weights w1, w2 and w3. They are then summed and 
put through an activation function f, creating the output y. 
the appropriate key or mouse click to the game. Since the basal 
ganglia is likely to play an important role in action selection 
and because of its old and stable evolutionary history, we 
claim that our implementation is a highly simplified model of 
the basal ganglia. Additionally, in order to keep the model 
simple, only positive reinforcement will be used and there will 
be no cost for taking actions. This has the added benefit of 
fitting the neurobiological findings better, because the 
dopamine error hypothesis mainly has been proven for 
positive reinforcement. Moreover, the behavior meets the four 
criteria of a specialized action selection function as defined by 
Redgrave et al (1999). In this way, MAIA is able to capture 
the essence of the “Wolpert premise” presented earlier - that 
the reason for brains is to produce adaptable movements. 
3 Methods 
Earlier we mentioned that the MEU (maximum expected 
utility) needs to be approximated. We do this with the Q-
learning algorithm, which in turn needs to be approximated 
for use in continuous state spaces. There are many methods 
for such function approximation, but we will do this with an 
artificial neural network (ANN). One can question how 
plausible ANN’s are as models of biological neuronal 
networks, but that is a question outside the scope of this work. 
Besides, as Balkenius (1995) argues; because we try to build 
a model of a creature, ANN is the most reasonable method. 
Briefly, an ANN is a simplified model of biological neural 
circuits, implementing an algorithm similar to Hebbian 
learning (Dayan & Abbott, 2001). A neuron is represented as 
a node and synapses by connections between nodes. Each 
connection has a “weight” (w) associated with it - usually a 
real number - that represents synapse strength. Connection 
inputs (s) to a node are multiplied by their respective weight 
and put through an activation function f which creates that 
node’s output as seen in Figure 4. 
3.1 The perceptron 
The simplest type of node to understand is the perceptron 
(Rosenblatt, 1958). It works as just described and can 
mathematically be described like so: K = L EM.M + ENOM3P   (6) 
where y is the perceptron’s output and b is the bias input which 
has its own weight. The bias can be understood spatially as 
allowing the function to move away from origo, similar to b 
in the simple linear equation: K = 7: + N   (7) 
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Due to its simplicity, the perceptron is limited to solving 
linear discriminations. Meaning that, if we continue the 
analogy with our linear equation (7), the perceptron can find a 
line separating two types of data among a collection of data 
points. So how do we teach the perceptron to do useful things? 
We use supervised learning as an example and the following 
step function (also seen in Figure 4) as the activation function: K = 1BILBE. + N > 0>T.>B0   (8) 
We can teach the system to perform AND and OR 
operations by inputting examples and compare the 
perceptron’s output with the known correct output. We then 
use the error of the output to adjust the weights. In Table 1 you 
can see training examples for the AND operation. 
Table 1. The AND operation is true (represented by y as 1) if inputs 
s1 and s2 are the same. If they are not the same, the AND operation 
is false (represented by y as 0). 
s1 s2 y 
0 0 1 
0 1 0 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
Usually, the weights are initialized randomly, so if we take 
the example from the first row of Table 1 and have weights w1 
as -0.5, w2 as 0.5, w3 as 0.2, with b as 1 and use equation (6) 
we get: K = L .P, .U = .PEP + .UEU + EVN = 0.2 
Which will, according to (8) give 1 as output. Here we can see 
the role of the bias. With the chosen activation function the 
perceptron would not be able to solve the problem if not for 
the bias, since regardless of the value of weights 1 and 2 the 
function would always be 0 without the bias and so not be able 
to output the correct 1 as we would like for an AND operation. 
If we go to the second row of Table 1 we instead get: K = L .P, .U = .PEP + .UEU + EVN = 0.7 
This will give 1 as output according to (8), which is incorrect; 
it should be 0. The weights will need to be updated in order 
for the perceptron to output the correct value. How do we do 
this then? 
We use an error function that calculates an error value, 
commonly called the delta rule. In its simplest form it is: >11?1 = G?11>GJBZ7TH> − G7TGHT7J>FBZ7TH>    (9) 
If we call the calculated value a “prediction” we can see that 
(9) is the same principle as the prediction errors we have 
discussed above, like the Rescorla-Wagner rule in (1) and the 
dopamine response in (5). So for our second example above it 
becomes: >11?1 = 0 − 1 = −1 
In order to avoid large changes in weights (too large of a 
change may “step over” the solution), we adjust the error with 
a learning rate α. As mentioned in the Q-learning section 
above, we can choose α as 0.1 and calculate the new weight 
values: EM = EM + $(−1 ∙ EM) 
Meaning that every weight’s new value is its own value 
multiplied by the error added to its old value. This goes on and  
 
Figure 5. A collection of Q-trons, creating our simple basal ganglia 
model. Every action is represented by a Q-tron (action1 and action2), 
each with its own weights. The output value, Q1 and Q2, is stored by 
the Q-tron, ready to be exploited. 
on for the examples in Table 1 until we always receive correct 
output (or as close to always as we can; to converge on the 
correct solution). Important to note here is that since there may 
be many possible values for w that will solve the problem, we 
are not guaranteed to converge on the optimal configuration 
of weight values. To summarize our example, we can now see 
that the perceptron approximates the function in (8). The 
“knowledge” of this approximation is stored in the weights, 
similar to how the memory mechanism of long term 
potentiation is represented by synapse strength (Kandel, 
2001). 
We should also note that since the perceptron is a linear 
classifier, it can only learn to distinguish between two 
categories of data if a line can be drawn between them. To 
again take an example from logical operations, the perceptron 
cannot learn the XOR (exclusive or) operation. A regular OR 
operation would return y as 1 for rows two, three and four in 
Table 1. XOR, however, is not true if both s1 and s2 are true. 
This makes it impossible to draw a straight line between true 
and false for XOR. This can, however, be solved by using 
several “layers” of perceptrons. In that case, inputs are sent to 
a layer of one or more perceptrons, all of which send their 
outputs to one or several “hidden” layers and finally to the end 
output. 
Such a network of perceptrons is usually what is meant by 
“artificial neural networks”. To again interpret this spatially, 
additional layers of perceptrons can be seen as creating 
additional lines so we can make a finer grained classification 
between data points. Convolutional neural networks, as used 
by the DQN agent, are in principle many such layers organized 
in a hierarchical structure that progressively recognize 
features of an input image in a similar fashion as the 
hierarchical structure of the visual cortex. 
3.2 The Q-tron 
Now then! How can we use the perceptron to handle states and 
actions with Q-learning? Why, with a Q-tron of course! 
The Q-tron represents an action that the modelled agent 
can perform, for example “take one step forward”. So the basic 
assumption for the Q-tron is that the action space for the agent 
is discrete, while the state space can be continuous. Referring 
to Figure 5, the agent observes the world as an array of 
arbitrary size, represented by the state s. The state does not 
have to be an RGB (Red, Green, Blue) image, it can be any 
numerical array. When a Q-tron is created, it sets its initial Q-
value to zero and initializes its weight array with random 
values between -0.5 and 0.5. The Q-tron itself only handles 
the storage and update of Q-values, meaning it handles 
equation (3). Action selection (exploration/exploitation),  
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Figure 6. A circular house. The agent always starts in room 0, from 
where it is possible to move “up” to room 1 or “down” to room 7. 
The other rooms work the same, so the agent can always move one 
room “up” or one room “down”. The goal is always room 5. 
terminal state, etc. is done in the main program itself. This is 
so that the network of Q-trons can more easily be extended 
with hidden layers in the future. During a forward pass - 
calculation of the Q value - the weights are multiplied by the 
state as in (6) and put through a sigmoid activation function 
(equation 10), which limits output between 0 and 1. L = 11+>−:  (10) 
The Q-tron updates its weights with a method called back-
propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1988) which uses the delta rule 
with gradient descent to approach the wanted value. This is 
where we adapt the error for the Q-learning equation from (4) 
to be used in the same approach as in (9). 
Gradient descent uses the derivative of the output value, 
which can be spatially interpreted as finding an optimal value 
(minimum or maximum) by taking steps in the direction of the 
slope of the function. The principle of this can be understood 
by imagining a three dimensional landscape with valleys and 
hills. So when an action has been taken, the error tells us if 
that step took us towards the top of the hill that we want to 
climb or not. With derivative of the sigmoid function being: \]\^ = .I_9?IF(:) ∙ (1 − .I_9?IF : ) (11) 
we get a gradient descent step where “error” is equation (4) 
and looks like: .J>C = >11?1 ∙ 5(., 7)(1 − 5(., 7) 
and the weights are then updated with: EM = EM + EM.J>C 
From Figure 5 it may seem like the Q-trons are unaware of 
each other, but even though only the Q-tron representing the 
action performed is updated, it takes the other actions’ Q-
values into account through the maxQ function. Also, as 
mentioned above on RL and Q-learning, we cannot be certain 
of convergence for the Q-trons. Specifically, we have two 
main problems here. The first is that gradient descent may find 
a local optimal value, meaning we find a hill but not the tallest 
hill in the world. There is also the possibility that we find the  
 
Figure 7. General layout of the software used. The program itself 
was written in Python, which communicated with MCPI to send and 
receive information from the CanaryMod server. Python also 
communicated with Windows to send keyboard and mouse 
commands and receive information on where the Minecraft game 
window was located and coordinates for screenshots. Minecraft 
connected to the CanaryMod server, which ran the plugin 
CanaryRaspberryJuice (not shown) allowing it to communicate with 
MCPI. Technically - if you are so inclined - everything 
communicated with the Windows operating system since all 
software was run on the same machine. 
tallest hill, but it takes significant amounts of time to get there. 
This is where our innate behavior comes in; if we implement 
it properly, it may allow for faster convergence up that hill. 
3.3 Getting through the house 
As we soon shall see, the simulations in Minecraft take many 
hours to complete. So in order to confirm that the Q-trons 
work as expected, a small pilot test was constructed. This test 
of the Q-trons was made in an environment constructed as a 
circular house, exemplified in Figure 6. The simulation used 
40 rooms instead of the eight rooms in the figure, but the 
principles are the same. The agent always started in room 0 
with the goal of finding the shortest route to the goal; room 5. 
The state s of the house was programmatically represented as 
a one dimensional array where the agent was represented by 
the value 10 and empty rooms by the value 0.1. So, in the case 
seen in Figure 6, the shortest route to the goal is to go “down” 
from 0 in three steps. In the simulation case, however, the 
shortest route would be to go “up” in five steps.  
As previously described, the agent has one Q-tron for each 
possible action so in the house environment there are two Q-
trons; one for “up” and one for “down”. Training of the Q-
trons was done in the following fashion: 
Algorithm 1. 
Initialize Q-trons with value of zero and random weights 
Repeat (for each episode): 
 Observe starting state s 
 Repeat (for each step of episode): 
  With probability epsilon, select random action a, 
  otherwise select optimal action as a 
  Take action a, observe reward r and new state s’ 
  Update Q-tron representing a, using given r, s, s’ 
  Set s’ as s 
 until s is goal state 
3.4 Software 
The main applications that were used and their relations can 
be seen in Figure 7. The complete source code for MAIA with  
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Figure 8. The cross is the center of the viewport and the white 
outline (exaggerated for clarity, in the game the outline is a thin 
black line) is the “block” that is currently selected and will be 
interacted with if a mouse button is pressed. As clearly seen, a very 
slight change in perspective changes what block is selected. 
installation instructions can be found on GitHub1. It also 
contains the CanaryMod server (see below) used for the 
project, since that server distribution is no longer maintained 
so providing it allows for easier replication (and 
improvement!) of the results. Initially an attempt was made to 
create a cross platform implementation but due to 
performance speed with screenshot capture and functionality 
issues with keyboard and mouse input, the final 
implementation is Windows only. 
3.4.1 Minecraft 
Minecraft2 is a 3D computer game created by Markus Persson 
and released in 2011 by Mojang, later sold to Microsoft. The 
game world is similar to our own, with hills, rivers, valleys, 
fields, animals and plants. There are also portals to other 
worlds and a wide variety of monsters, all of which may or 
may not reflect reality. The game’s environments are made 
from blocks, creating a distinguishable “blocky” look that 
makes features fairly big and non-detailed. This makes the 
game a good test environment for our intelligent agent. 
The player sees the world in first person view and can 
collect materials by “chopping” blocks (destroying them) and 
combine those materials to craft items with which to build 
structures. Movement is made with the keyboard and the 
camera view is changed by moving the mouse around. 
Interaction with the world works through clicking the mouse 
buttons. 
It is not without its problems, however, as can be seen in 
Figure 8. To select a block for interaction, it needs to be 
centered in the view. But smaller objects like flowers have 
smaller “selection boxes” which means that a flower may be 
centered in view but not selected. The opposite is also true; a 
flower may be selected without being central in the view. This 
of course complicates our task. 
3.4.2 CanaryMod Server 
The CanaryMod3 Server 1.2 (development of which 
unfortunately seems to be discontinued as of summer 2015 but 
can still be downloaded) is a custom version of the official 
Minecraft server and allows the use of plugins. One such 
plugin is CanaryRaspberryJuice4 and it opens a port allowing 
the Python module MCPI to communicate with the 
CanaryMod server. This way, we can manipulate the player 
and the world blocks with Python code. Furthermore, the  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 https://www.github.com/fohria/maia 
2 http://www.minecraft.net, version 1.8 for the Windows operating system 
3 https://github.com/CanaryModTeam/CanaryMod!
 
Figure 9. Starting with the 3D game world, the gamewindow 
component observes the game state by taking a screenshot. This 
percept is forwarded to the Behavior component, which 
communicates with the Q-trons to decide on an action. The selected 
action is sent to actionutils, which in turn calls on AID (Artificial 
Interface Device) to send the action command to the game. In case 
the chop action is selected, the chop module will check the selected 
game block to see if it is a flower and if it is gone after the chop 
action has been performed. The reward signal is then sent back to 
the Q-trons for updating. 
CanaryMod server allows many custom settings and the main 
ones used for MAIA was turning off monsters, health and 
hunger and set long lasting daytime so the input colors were 
held at constant luminance. 
3.4.3 Python and its many libraries 
Python5 2.7 was used since the availability of libraries are still 
better than the now seven years old Python 3. The previously 
mentioned MCPI module allowed Python to communicate 
with the CanaryMod server. The other main libraries used was 
Numpy for mathematical operations, Pillow for taking 
screenshots and PyWin32 to access the Windows operating 
system in order to get coordinates for the Minecraft game 
window and send keyboard and mouse input. A full list of 
libraries used can be found on MAIA’s GitHub page. 
3.5 MAIA - Minecraft Artificial Intelligence Agent 
MAIA consists of three main components; eyes, brain and 
motor control together with several subcomponents to allow 
communication between the main components and provide the 
possibility of saving data for analysis. An overview of the 
main components can be seen in Figure 9 and will presently 
be presented in more detail along with additional modules and 
components. We should mention here that the other agents of 
course use most of these modules as well. 
3.5.1 gamewindow 
These functions utilize the win32api to find the Minecraft 
game window, focus it so action inputs are fed to Minecraft 
and not some other active window and also returns the screen 
coordinates for the center of the game window itself. These 
coordinates are used by the previously mentioned Pillow 
library to grab frames of a chosen size from the center of the 
game screen. These frames are grabbed as RGB tuples, 
converted to a 1D Numpy array and returned for use as state 
input to the Q-trons. For example, a grabbed frame of size 
4 https://github.com/martinohanlon/canaryraspberryjuice 
5 http://www.python.org 
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50x50 pixels will be returned as a Numpy array of size 
50x50x3.  
3.5.2 Behavior 
This algorithm is similar to the one presented for “getting 
through the house” but with a few additions, mainly the innate 
behavior to chop if seeing red. We classified something as red 
in two ways; the first (MAIA1) counted how many pixels in a 
captured frame matched exactly the RGB values of the four 
light red pixels on the flower rings. If at least five such pixels 
were found, the frame was classified as red. The second 
approach (called MAIA2) looked at the average amount of red 
in the observed state using the following formula: `4.a(bcd) > 2  (12) 
where R, G, B are the average values of those components in 
the grabbed frame. For both versions, if a frame was classified 
as red, there was a probability of 0.8 that the chop action 
would be selected. With one flower chopped as the goal state 
and exploration/exploitation strategy ε-greedy, the algorithm 
is thus: 
Algorithm 2. 
Initialize Q-trons with value of zero and random weights 
Repeat (for each episode): 
 Observe starting state s 
 Repeat (for each step of episode): 
 If s is red, with p=0.8 select chop as action a, 
  otherwise; 
With probability epsilon, select random 
action a, 
   otherwise select optimal action as a 
  Take action a, observe reward r and new state s’ 
  Update Q-tron representing a, using given r, s, s’ 
  Set s’ as s 
 until s is goal state 
3.5.3 Q-trons 
The actions made available were step left, right, forward or 
backward, look left or right and chop. This makes for seven 
actions and thus seven Q-trons. Since we used RGB frames of 
size 50x50, the total number of weights was 7501, where the 
last one is for the bias. 
3.5.4 actionutils 
The take_action.py function receives the selected action and 
calls on the AID module to perform the key press or mouse 
click associated with that action. Most importantly, 
get_block_position.py and chop.py work together to enable 
counting of the amount of flowers that have been picked. They 
use the MCPI event function pollBlockHits which listens to 
right clicks made when the player has a sword equipped. Yes, 
that is correct, this only works with a sword. Only peasants 
pick flowers, real knights of the round table cut them with 
sharp swords because that way the flower will last longer in 
their loved ones’ vase. If a block is in range, the event function 
returns the type of block clicked. This event listener required 
many hours of careful testing in order to get working as 
intended for the current implementation, since it needed to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 http://www.nodejs.org 
7 http://morrisjs.github.io/morris.js 
synchronize with in game animations and AID calls to actually 
return something. 
Every move action - step left, right, forward and backward 
- was hard coded as sending the key press for 0.25 s. Looking 
left or right was defined as moving the mouse cursor 150 
pixels to the left or right, respectively. 
3.5.5 AID 
When humans interact with computers, input devices are 
commonly called Human Interface Devices so here we use the 
AID - Artificial Interface Device. In short, it uses win32api 
calls with C structures to send key presses and mouse clicks 
to Windows and in turn Minecraft, if that is the currently 
focused window. 
3.5.6 API 
This is a small nodejs6 websocket server that listens to 
incoming traffic on one port from the running Maia 
application and redirects that information to another port that 
the client connects to. The client is run in a browser and uses 
morris.js7 to display graphs of the current Q-value for the 
different actions. The API server was mainly used for 
debugging purposes and turned off during the simulation runs. 
3.5.7 counterupdaters.py 
Contains functions to update performance measure counters 
and save these to disk both during the simulation and when the 
program exits. 
3.5.8 prepareworld.py 
This is run before every new round (see below for explanation 
of rounds) and uses MCPI to create a pasture with flowers. It 
finds the current position of the player, places a grass block 
directly below the player and additional grass blocks in a 
square with sides of 20 blocks around that grass block. On the 
grass it then places red flower blocks and around the grass 
blocks a dirt wall two blocks high so that the player cannot get 
out of the pasture. It also places air blocks around and above 
the player to avoid that any part of the pasture is in shadow 
from the in game sun, as that would change the shadowed 
flowers’ colors. This means that the agent always starts in the 
center of the pasture every new round. 
3.6 Hardware 
Virtual machines could unfortunately not be used, as the 
graphics capabilities were insufficient. Instead, the 
simulations were run on three desktop computers, two of 
which used Windows 7 and one used Windows 8.1. 
3.7 Analytical tools 
Analysis was made with the programming language R8. 
Actions taken per episode were averaged over simulation runs 
and plotted with the ggplot package, using the generalized 
additive model (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990) for house 
simulations and local polynomial regression fitting (Cleveland 
et al., 1992) for the Minecraft simulations. 
8 https://www.r-project.org/ 
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Figure 10. Average number of actions per episode for the house agent, aggregated over 50 simulation runs. The solid line represents the 
mean and the shadow is the standard error. Vertical dotted lines indicate when learning rate α was decreased. 
 
Figure 11. Average actions per episode for the two versions of MAIA that have different red check mechanisms. Unfortunately, no learning 
seems to occur. The solid lines are the mean values and shadows represent standard error. Vertical dotted lines indicate when learning rate α 
was decreased. 
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Figure 12. Average actions per episode for the random walker RW contrasted with the two versions of MAIA. MAIA1 is slightly better than 
RW until after around 150 episodes. Solid lines are the mean values and shadows represent standard error. 
 
Figure 13. Average actions per episode for the pure Q-learner PQ contrasted with the two versions of MAIA. We can clearly see that PQ 
performance is worse. Solid lines are the mean values and shadows represent standard error. 
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4 Experiments and Results 
For clarity, we will here first explain the experimental 
procedures and then the results of the experimental 
simulations. 
4.1 Getting through the house 
Training of the house agent (Algorithm 1) was performed with 
1000 episodes for one simulation run. The parameters used for 
the house agent were α=0.1 and γ=0.9. ε was set to an initial 
0.5 and was progressively decreased in steps of 0.1 every 100 
episodes and then kept at 0.1 for episodes 401-1000. 
Figure 10 shows average number of actions taken each 
episode for an aggregate of 50 simulation runs for the house 
agent. As can be seen, performance increases (fewer actions 
per episode) until around 400 episodes where performance 
starts to decrease again (increasing actions per episode). 
Kaelbling et al. (1996) mentions how such oscillatory 
behavior can occur even in simple environments and Mnih et 
al. (2013) uses experience replay to solve this issue. It may 
also be an artefact of the low exploration rate (0.1) used after 
400 episodes in combination with the randomness inherent in 
the problem, causing the agent to alternate between choosing 
up and down as the optimal route. In other words, only in some 
of the runs will the agent learn to go up in five steps and in 
some runs it will go down in 35 or more steps, explaining the 
average being between 30 and 40 steps for episodes after the 
400 mark.  
Nevertheless, we can clearly see that performance in 
general increases during the simulation run so it seems that 
our Q-trons work. It is also worth mentioning that the 
decreasing performance at the “tail” was mainly due to the 
influence of one out of the fifty runs. 
4.2 Minecraft simulations 
As mentioned previously, one episode equaled one flower 
picked. Each simulation run used 200 episodes and was also 
divided into rounds of 20 flowers picked. When one round was 
complete, a new pasture was created and ε was decreased by 
0.1. ε was initially set to 0.6 for all q-learner versions and held 
at 0.1 for episodes 101-200. γ was always 0.9 and α=0.1. 
These parameters should ideally be tested with different 
values for different simulation runs in order to find the best 
combination. Unfortunately, time did not allow for this, so 
even though these values are reasonable, they have been 
chosen somewhat arbitrarily. Due to the same time 
constraints, initial attempts with simulation runs of more than 
200 episodes (and different round lengths) were abandoned. 
The random walker RW used only random actions of the 
seven available each step. The “pure” Q-learner PQ used 
Algorithm 1 while MAIA1 and MAIA2 used Algorithm 2. 
The difference between MAIA1 and MAIA2 was the 
mechanism for seeing red, explained in section 3.5.2 above. 
4.2.1 MAIA1 versus MAIA2 
MAIA1 was successfully run 13 times, with a mean run time 
of 0.84 h (SD=0.25). MAIA2 was successfully run 14 times, 
with a mean run time of 1.95 h (SD=1.25). Like for the house 
test, an aggregate over simulation runs was averaged for both 
MAIA versions and are presented together in Figure 11. We 
can see that MAIA2 seems to decrease in performance as the 
chance for random actions, ε, decreases. MAIA1 on the other 
hand does not decrease in performance until around 150 
episodes, which is mainly caused by a few outliers. 
Unfortunately, neither version shows any sign of learning, like 
the house agent in Figure 10. This will be further discussed 
below, but briefly, there are two main reasons for this 
discrepancy. First, the house agent observes the entire world 
state while MAIA only observes parts of it. Second, the house 
state is reset each time the goal is reached, while in the MAIA 
simulations the world is reset every twenty flowers. This 
makes the rewards occur randomly, which can cause 
performance issues as discussed in section 2.2. 
As an interesting side note, version 1 was the only agent 
(except for a random walker) that successfully completed runs 
of 1000 episodes in less than 24h. 
4.2.2 Random walker versus MAIA siblings 
Ten random walker (RW) simulations were run with a mean 
run time of 1.01h (SD=0.05h) and is presented together with 
the MAIA siblings in Figure 12. We can see that the RW agent 
has steady performance over all episodes as is to be expected. 
Also, it may at first seem like a win for MAIA1, but most 
likely, a random walker with a red check function would at 
least match its performance, meaning that version 1 of MAIA 
is at random levels of performance until around 150 episodes 
when it gets worse. 
4.2.3 PQ agent versus MAIA siblings 
The “pure” Q-learner (PQ) successfully completed five runs 
with a mean run time of 18.7h (SD=22, shortest run time was 
4.9h and longest 57h). The average actions per episode over 
these five runs are contrasted with the two MAIA versions in 
Figure 13. The pure Q-learner is not performant compared to 
both MAIA siblings, which is in line with expectations. 
4.2.4 General observations 
Animals should be observed in their natural environment and 
since the two MAIA siblings have never known anything else 
than the flowered pasture, it is as much their habitat as 
anything else. It was not feasible to observe all simulations all 
the time of course, but some observations worth mentioning 
were made. 
The most successful simulations had look left or look right 
as the dominant behavior, causing the agent to chop innately, 
turn, chop and so on. The downside of this strategy was that 
the agent created a circle around it without flowers, but a few 
successful exploration steps towards uncut areas allowed it to 
begin circling again. For the same reason, sometimes this did 
not work at all, because the few exploration actions taken 
either made the agent for example go forward and then 
backward again or it stepped towards areas already chopped. 
Another common strategy, but less successful, was for one 
of the step movements to become dominant. This works fine 
early in a round, as it steps left for example, chops innately, 
then steps left again and chops another flower. But soon it 
steps left into a wall and the agent then in the best case started 
sliding along the wall with repeated left movements and 
chopped innately as it passed flowers near that wall. In the 
worst cases though, the agent moved “straight” into the wall 
and not sliding along it (or moved into a corner), so only the 
specific action of look right or look left would save it. 
Moreover, it was not uncommon for the innate behavior to 
cause the action count to increase. Its function works nicely 
when going from an empty space to where there are flowers, 
but as seen in Figure 8, sometimes the innate behavior caused 
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the agent to continue chopping many times without reward 
because the selection was a ground block instead of a flower. 
In those cases, there is only a 20% chance it will go on to 
explore/exploit actions. 
5 Discussion 
This project was born of a desire to understand the principles 
of the DQN agent by Mnih et al. (2015) and learn the 
fundamentals of programming an agent with reinforcement 
learning. In that regard, I believe it was a success. The other 
goal was to investigate the biological basis of reinforcement 
learning and whether an innate behavior would improve the 
performance of our agent. As seen in Figure 13, that is 
certainly the case. 
But what kind of animal is MAIA supposed to be? 
Depending on what “level” of species we believe the model 
corresponds to, the results would be impressive for a single 
cell organism but abysmal for a dog. Both cases are 
worthwhile though, since by studying common features of 
neural biology – in this case the basal ganglia (which the 
single cell organism lacks) – between species we can figure 
out how other areas work, because evolution often builds on 
previous structures. A possible objection to the approach taken 
here is that the innate behavior is motivated by behavior in 
both vertebrates such as dog and monkey as well as foraging 
insects. I believe the reasoning is sound though, from the 
perspective of a creature in a pasture of red flowers, however 
small and contained that world may be. 
More concerning is that the current results are not in 
agreement with the role of the basal ganglia system as an 
“action selector”, since the general impression from Figure 12 
is that we might as well use a random walker. The pattern we 
would have liked to see is the one from Figure 10, but both 
versions of MAIA seem to decrease in performance as the 
exploration rate goes down. In other words, the high degree of 
randomness in early rounds “saves” the MAIA agents from 
getting stuck. A silly interpretation would be that all previous 
research is wrong and the basal ganglia has nothing to do with 
reinforcement learning or action selection. A more reasonable 
interpretation is that our model does not work as intended. 
Why is this? 
Most importantly, there is no cost for performing an 
action. A real creature uses energy when it moves and thus 
cannot walk perpetually into a wall without dying of thirst or 
hunger. Cost could be implemented as a negative reward given 
for those actions that do not lead to the goal state of a chopped 
flower. That way, the “optimal” behavior of walking into a 
wall or corner would more quickly result in that action’s Q-
value to decrease and so allow another action to become 
optimal and chosen when the exploit chance is high. Also, 
since there are four actions for taking steps and two for 
looking around, there is a higher chance of a step action being 
chosen initially, and if the new state causes an innate chop the 
agent is likely to continue the step movement into a wall. 
Furthermore, there is the simplicity of our model. We 
mentioned how several layers of perceptrons allows the 
network to solve more difficult problems. And as we can see 
in Figure 8, there are tiny differences between having a flower 
or the ground selected. The effect is that the input to the Q-
tron network is basically the same for both of those cases, 
making the problem almost impossible to solve. Every added 
layer in a neural network allows for finer features to be 
detected, and since those selection lines in Figure 8 are so 
small we would probably need a deep convolutional network 
in order to detect them. 
Additionally, the Q-tron implementation does not utilize 
Markovian methods in any way. MAIA can only see one 
screenshot at a time, making the task partially observable 
because it is not possible to know the context from that single 
screenshot. The DQN agent (Mnih et al., 2015), for example, 
constructed MDP’s out of series of state-action-reward chains 
and used those series as states in the Q-function. In that way, 
it could avoid MAIA’s problem. 
As mentioned, the innate behavior was meant to partly 
remedy the implementational weaknesses of the Q-tron. But 
there were cases where the innate behavior wrongly identified 
flowers, because of the mentioned “selection problem”. There 
are ways we could construct a better innate behavior, for 
example; check every quadrant of the grabbed frame for equal 
amounts of red which would allow the innate behavior to 
trigger for centrally located flowers. We could also train a 
neural network with a genetic algorithm, teaching it to identify 
selected flowers. It would probably have to be quite large, but 
that training could be done off-line and then put in as a module 
in the program. This method would be the most reasonable for 
an innate behavior, since natural creatures are likely to have 
evolved their behaviors in a similar way. 
The downside of using an innate behavior is that the 
implementation becomes task specific. If we wanted MAIA to 
pick yellow flowers, performance would fall to levels on par 
with the pure Q-learner. The DQN agent, on the other hand, is 
capable of learning to play many different games with the 
same settings and parameters. However, it still needs to train 
each game separately. There is no transfer of learning, i.e. by 
training on one game it also becomes better at another. 
Animals, and especially humans, do transfer some kind of 
general knowledge from experience; if you have played many 
video games you are likely to have a better initial performance 
in a new game compared to a video game naïve human. We 
can compare this line of thought with the example of New 
Caledonian crows from the background section. They 
apparently have some sort of innate ability to sample their 
environment for state-action correlations and learning 
mechanisms guide this behavior to successful 
implementation. Humans have more generalized ways of 
sampling both their environments and bodies, just look at 
babies wildly flailing their limbs around. So innately 
speaking, there seems to be a difference in degree of 
generalization of innate behaviors between species, 
underlying the sampling necessary to update the prior 
distribution of Bayesian models (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 
2000; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). 
Which takes us to the questions of what an innate behavior 
is and where does it come from? Is it a specialized function or 
a general one? If specialized, does it work like showed here 
with some manipulation or control of input that works in 
coordination with action specification in the basal ganglia or 
is it a separate process that bypasses regular action selection?  
In the background section, we referred to Shettleworth’s 
(2013) statement that differentiating innate and learned 
behavior is “meaningless”, because they interact in ways that 
make them very difficult to disentangle. But what the results 
here show, especially those in Figure 11, is that the specifics 
of the innate mechanism play a very important role for 
behavior. It is therefore not beneficial to call the question of 
innate versus learned behavior for a meaningless one. It is 
rather a highly meaningful question to ask because we need to 
find the answer in order to build proper models. For if we 
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cannot build such models it is doubtful we have truly 
understood anything at all. 
5.1 Future work 
With the assumption that the action selection role of basal 
ganglia is correct, how do we increase performance while 
conforming to biological findings?  
There are many possibilities for improving the Q-tron 
model of the basal ganglia, with three main approaches. First; 
to expand the perceptual input with preprocessing or an ANN 
with more capacity similar to the discussion above on innate 
mechanisms, i.e. a deep network with hierarchical layers 
similar to visual cortex structure. Second; motor control would 
ideally be expanded with motor signals instead of input to the 
game, as it would allow for easier transfer of the model to a 
physical robot. For a nice example of a combination of these 
two “expansion slots”, see Levine et al. (2015). The third 
option is to expand the complexity of the current model. 
It would be simple to state that to improve our Q-tron 
model, we would add deep convolutional networks with 
experience replay, Markov methods and aversive reinforcers 
or costs for performing actions. But as mentioned, it is not 
self-evident where these methods fit into the neurobiological 
picture. If an MDP series of state-action-reward sequences is 
used as one state as in the DQN agent, would we still be 
talking about the basal ganglia? Or is it rather something that 
happens in conjunction with short and/or long-term memory 
in frontal cortex and hippocampus? And since the biological 
evidence mainly points to a role for basal ganglia components 
in positive reinforcement, where does cost of performing 
actions come from – as a specialized component in the 
learning algorithm or a general property of the entire system 
that is refilled with food and drink?  
Similar questions can be asked for eligibility traces and 
experience replay. It is likely that both are necessary, since 
one is made on-line and explains some neurobiological 
findings (eligibility trace; Pan et al., 2005) while the other 
looks similar to memory consolidation during sleep 
(experience replay; Mnih et al., 2015). But in the latter case, 
if hippocampus is to be involved, we also need to consider the 
spatial maps created there (Hafting et al., 2005). 
So an interesting way of improving MAIA would be to add 
a hippocampus module that dynamically creates a spatial map, 
in which MDP series of state-action-reward sequences are 
stored. If successful, this could generate predictions testable 
in real creatures and physical robots. In the latter case, it would 
be especially interesting to see if training can be done in 
Minecraft and transferred to a physical robot. Another 
interesting venue would be to combine the theory behind the 
prediction errors shown throughout our previous sections with 
the more general prediction error theory of Friston (2010) in 
an effort to find common ground. 
There is a long road ahead before we reach the point of 
robot dogs that can play fetch. As we have shown, much of 
today’s cutting edge research is based on algorithms many 
decades old. But the union of machine learning and 
neuroscience can help us find new answers to the questions 
we have and the connections between algorithms and biology 
for reinforcement learning show this particularly well. Is it not 
exciting that correlates for learning algorithms are found in 
dopamine neurons? I think so, and I intend to look deeper. 
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